Concept In The Us Foreign Policy Politics Essay

The research will analyze the Rogue States construct in the US foreign policy and analyse how this construct shaped US foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. There is no uncertainty that the “ Rogue States ” construct and US foreign policy are interrelated. But what about the causal consequence? The conceptual attacks to the interrelatedness of these phenomenons are based on the psychological attack, on “ larning from history ” and the usage of historical analogies, national security involvements, and the desire to go involved in international personal businesss. The research will look into the advancement of the “ Rogue States ” construct as a contemplation of the US foreign policy nucleus precedences to the terminal of the Cold War.

Introduction

There were ever jobs between states. The provinces compete with each other and sometimes are at war. As the consequence, the “ enemy image ” is good known in international jurisprudence and political relations and is investigated rather good get downing from the ancient times. The job is that the globalisation processes every bit good as the rise of the human rights and democracy motions shifted nucleus grounds for the international struggle from the cardinal rules of the Westphalia ‘s system ( such as the territorial sovereignty and the right of the province to take its faith and to find its ain domestic policy )[ 1 ]to the preventative actions against those who jeopardize international peace and security, violate accepted international norms of behaviour and do non esteem the basic human values.

The 2nd factor that favored the outgrowth of the new philosophy was the prostration of the Soviet Union. It happened because of internal contradictions, chiefly economic, every bit good as because of the terminal of the communism ‘s sole power. As Jack Matlock, a U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. during the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush disposals, provinces, the people who present it as a triumph of one state over another are wrong, aˆ¦ it was the triumph of one thought over another.[ 2 ]However, the thought that somehow the U.S. beat the Soviet Union has led to a spirit of triumphalism and a feeling of omnipotence as the “ exclusive world power, ” that became evident in political relations.

The combination of these phenomenon – prosecuting the new precedences in the foreign policy ( like international peace, security, and human rights ) and the “ exclusive world power ” political relations — gave rise to the procedure of cardinal transmutation of the “ enemy image ” and outgrowth of the new constructs in political relations, one of which was the “ Rogue States ” construct.

The term “ Rogue States ” became popular in the 1980s, chiefly in the United States, to depict minor absolutisms ( the list included Cuba, Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, and North Korea ) that posed a menace to the Cold War order. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, as Nader Mousavizadeh, an International Institute for Strategic Studies Consulting Senior Fellow argues, the term described provinces unwilling to suit themselves to the “ terminal of history ” and to conform to US values.[ 3 ]Michael Klare, professor of Peace and World Security Studies, agrees to this point of view and notices that these provinces “ set on undermining the prevailing universe order. ”[ 4 ]Unfortunately, though the “ Rogue States ” term was used extensively in the post-Cold War period, more precise definition of this label ne’er appeared. Lumping states together as knaves merely demonized them, that is why the Bill Clinton disposal replaced the one-size-fits-all label with the more diplomatic-sounding “ provinces of concern ” in 2000. The label, nevertheless, was resurrected by the George W. Bush disposal.

In our clip, some research workers, like Robert Litwak, Vice President of The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, rise uncertainties as to whether “ Rogue States ” are so a distinguishable class.[ 5 ]Others, like Albert Carnesale, Chancellor of the Exchequer emeritus and professor of public policy, province that there is no demand to specify a knave province: “ it ‘s kind of similar erotica — you know it when you see it. ”[ 6 ]Our research will analyze the beginning of this construct, the grounds and the states the US policymakers implied while utilizing this label and what the focal point of the American post-Cold War policy was. In future, specifying the nucleus features of “ knaves ” at that period will assist us to analyze if the policy that the US pursued toward “ Rogue provinces ” was sensible and justified.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are two ways to understand the connexion between the “ rogue provinces ” construct and the United States political relations. The first group of theories provinces that the realisation of the kernel of the “ job provinces ” impacts political picks.

For illustration, harmonizing to political psychological science, when we categorize the political universe, we organize the international environment in footings of types of provinces or images, such as the enemy or the ally. Image theory is a political attack that draws connexions between policymakers ‘ image of the state and its ensuing behaviour.[ 7 ]For illustration, the knave is inferior in capableness and civilization, but controlled and supported by the enemy and, as the consequence, is besides really harmful in their purposes.[ 8 ]Besides, people have emotional responses to political issues, histrions and events every bit good as to political rules and ideals that they value. These certain emotions are closely associated with peculiar images[ 9 ]. If we add to the strategy the attitude, or “ the organized set of beliefs, prevailing over clip, which is utile in explicating the single response to the inclinations, ”[ 10 ]we will happen out that the knave is the “ bad seed ” , the irresponsible kid that can non be dealt with the reason and constructively. Responses to this type of province are driven by a sense of high quality. They are bad kids who must be taught a lesson with a force. One does non negociate with bad kids, one punishes them.[ 11 ]

One more thought is based on the utilizing of historical analogies in the policy decision-making procedure. It builds on old efforts to understand the function of “ larning from history ” in international political relations. The term “ historical analogy ” signifies an illation that if two or more events separated in clip and hold in one regard, so they may besides hold in another.[ 12 ]Yuen Foong Khong references that the policymakers frequently use analogies to analyse or do sense of their foreign policy quandary and so suggest the possible options.[ 13 ]Therefore, the deduction of the “ rogue provinces ” philosophy is rooted in experience of covering with enemy provinces.

The other group of theories argue the dependance of the “ knave province ” construct on the political precedences. With the terminal of the Cold War, outstanding international dealingss bookmans began chalk outing out the dimensions of the new international construction and theorize about its hereafter. Central to much of that treatments was the outlook that new great power challengers would necessarily emerge to equilibrate the power of the United States.

Rogue provinces were a Third World phenomenon ; the great power challengers of the hereafter, the provinces that truly mattered for American security, would come from Europe,[ 14 ]East Asia or even a resurgent Russia.[ 15 ]In such a scene, Kenneth Waltz argued, there are few immediate menaces to American security and therefore the United States enjoys great freedom to find where and when it will go occupied internationally.[ 16 ]As Waltz argues, foreign policy is driven non by external security involvements, but “ internal political force per unit areas and national aspirations. ” This claim has a peculiar relevancy for the survey of the rhetoric and world of knave province behaviour and the beginning and impact of policies intended to pull off and transform such provinces.

Those bookmans who have examined the outgrowth of the knave construct in American foreign policy link it to the Pentagon ‘s pursuit for a new post-Cold War mission that would warrant retaining every bit much as possible of its Cold War-era force degrees and budget.[ 17 ]Therefore, in maintaining with Waltz ‘s claims refering the forces driving foreign policy doing during this period of structural alteration, the American arrested development on knave provinces may be apprehensible non as a reaction to echt security involvements, but to political force per unit areas emanating from an entrenched national defence and foreign policy constitution contending to remain relevant in a drastically altered international environment. Similarly, policies like the Clinton disposal ‘s double containment scheme, John McCain ‘s “ knave province push back ”[ 18 ]proposal, or the Bush Doctrine of preemptive military action against emergent menace provinces, may be seen as contemplations of an American national aspiration to widen its writ to regions where its influence or control have historically been far from complete. Under Waltz ‘s attack knave province policy can be understood as a affair of pick: American determination shapers focused on knaves because they could, non because they had to.

Alternatively it can be argued that United states policy shaper ‘s concern over knave provinces, and the policies that emerged out of that concern, are both consistent with and root from the demands of hegemony, of “ continuing the unipolar minute ” as Michael Mastanduno puts it.[ 19 ]A scheme of preponderance requires the dominant power to react to serious challenges to its power and authorization if it is to keep its place of primacy, irrespective of where those challenges arise.[ 20 ]One of the effects of the terminal of the Cold War is that Third World provinces have both greater freedom and progressively greater capableness to endanger the involvements of the United States, including militarily.[ 21 ]In short, the focal point on knave provinces that came to rule American foreign and defence policies in the 1990s was a affair non of pick but of necessity after all. Whether driven by pick or necessity the fact remains that American policy shapers in their rhetoric justified the foreign and defence policies that emerged in the 1990s as required to run into the immediate and relentless menace represented by aggressive provinces.

One more thought of the beginnings of “ rogue provinces ” comes from Burry Rubin. He argues that this construct besides has a specific nexus to America ‘s ain self-image and its relationship with the universe. Protected by both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, with no other strong powers in the Western Hemisphere, American political civilization was mostly shaped in the absence of the sorts of external menaces which determined European diplomatic constructs. From the other manus, America was the first modern democratic province, produced by an anti-colonial revolution and it sought to project its political orientation – anti-monarchical, pro-democratic, and pro-human rights. The United States needed a motivation to go involved in international personal businesss, and issues environing democracy, human rights, keeping stableness, and opposing aggression were the most likely campaigners.[ 22 ]

Theory AND HYPOTHESIS

Theory: Our point of position is based on the premise that the “ Rogue States ” construct is related chiefly to the US security involvements. Primary aim of the US foreign policy at the post-Cold War period was non-proliferation of atomic arms and therefore continuing the security in the universe.

Hypothesis: It is likely that the construct of “ Rogues States ” became a important portion of the US post-Cold War policy as the issue that was related chiefly to the security involvements.

Unit of measurements of analysis: Time periods of clip. The first one will be the “ Cold War period, ” the 2nd — the “ post-Cold War period. ”

Concepts: 1. “ Rogues States. ” Although politicians use a big figure of footings and definitions sing enemy provinces, in our research we will analyze merely one — “ Rogue States. ” First of wholly, this construct appeared earlier than other labels for the job provinces. Second, the footings like “ Axis of immorality, ” “ Sponsors of Terrorism, ” “ Beyond the Axis of Evil, ” “ Axis of Terror, ” “ Outstations of Tyranny, ” “ Pariah States ” etc. normally have a individual significance ( for illustration, as a province that patrons terrorism or oppress their ain people ) . The “ Rogue States ” construct is a broader one and includes the particular illustrations of dictatorship that are non merely inhibitory but besides aggressive.[ 23 ]

2. “ Significant portion of the US foreign policy. ” Politics implies non merely to the procedures within civil authoritiess. All the society groups, including individual people, civil establishments or academic communities that influence the governments, take part in political procedures. Therefore, in our research we will analyze all the paperss that contain the word “ knave ” , including the addresss or imperativeness conferences of authorities functionaries, bookmans, research workers, public etc. The “ significance ” will be determined if the term is used more frequently and by the most of import policymakers ( like President or Secretary of State ) than it was before ( or ) and as portion of the American foreign policy.

3. “ The terminal of the Cold War. ” The research workers have a batch of thoughts about the exact day of the month of the terminal of the Cold War. It could be either the twelvemonth when Mikhail Gorbachev started “ perestroika ” ( 1988 ) , or when the Eastern Europe states rejected socialism and the Warsaw Treaty broke down ( 1989 ) , or when the USSR collapsed ( 1991 ) . Taking into history the different sentiments about the day of the months about the Cold War, we will compare the periods from 1981 till the Jan 1, 1988 and from Jan 1, 1992 boulder clay 1994.

4. “ Security involvements. ” The constituent of the US post-Cold War policy, that was expressed in the non-proliferation of atomic arm and the continuing the “ position quo. ”

Variables. We will utilize four independent variables: “ Frequency of Use, ” “ Speaker, ” “ States, ” and “ Policy. ”

The first two variables will mention to the first portion of our hypothesis — “ construct of “ Rogues States ” became a important portion of the US post-Cold War policy. ” The “ Speaker ” variable will include the following three elements: President, vice-President, and Secretary of State ( 1 ) ; other functionaries ( 2 ) ; and research workers ( 3 ) .

The 2nd portion of the hypothesis — that the construct was related chiefly to the security involvements — will necessitate the designation of the states and policies associated with “ Rogue States. ” In add-on to the list of states that we will acquire during the research, we will utilize the component “ No Name, ” that means that the policy is used without adverting any state. The possible sorts of policies are: Peace Threat, Wish to Acquire WMD, Weapon trafficking, Terrorist Support, Democracy and Human Rights, Refusal to Support US Policy, and No Reason.

Method

Historical beginning stuff: In order to minimise the possible inauspicious consequence of selectivity and prejudice, we will utilize the archive of the “ New York Times ” newspaper.

1. Using this beginning will extinguish the job of superior beginnings, because the archive includes both the grounds modern-day to the event and the issues that were written about the after the event. 2. This sort of probe ( historical research ) is simple: it requires neither money nor interlingual rendition from another linguistic communication that can belie the kernel. Furthermore, in comparing with other of import policy newspapers ( “ USA today, ” “ The Wall Street Journal, ” “ The Washington Post ” ) , “ The NY Times ” has an easy accessible archive. 3. The chosen method increases the dependability of the variables, bring forthing indistinguishable consequences if replicated by other research workers. Note, nevertheless, that we can non guarantee that the consequences of the same research will be perfectly indistinguishable if we use another newspaper, for illustration “ The Washington Post. ” However, the content of the above mentioned documents is so similar as to non well bias the consequences.

The periods: We will compare the information that will be collected from two periods: 1981-the terminal of the 1987 ( first period ) and 1992-the terminal of 1994 ( 2nd period ) . It does non count that these periods have different clip length, because we will compare the obtained agencies.

The entering units: In the instance of the first variable ( “ Frequency of Use ” ) we will cipher the figure of articles in which the word “ knave ” is used. In the instance of the 2nd variable ( “ Speaker ” ) we will analyze the figure of times when the “ component ” uses the word “ knave ” . Why do we use different methods of computation? We consider that sometimes talker repeats the phrase in order to beef up the consequence of the words. Therefore, the fact of reduplication is of import.

The elements for the 3rd variable ( “ Countries ” ) will be found out during the research. After that we will enter all the instances when the current state is linked to the specific “ Policy. ” For illustration, the phrase “ rogue leaders who threaten to utilize their ain atomic, chemical or biological arms ” will be interpreted like +1 to “ No Name ” and +1 to “ Peace Threat. ”

Correctionss: We will take from the informations list all the paperss that use the term “ knave ” in a manner that is inconsistent with the research, like “ knave elephant, ” “ rogue operations ” etc. Furthermore, we will deduct from the 2nd period and add to the first one all the informations that refer to the Cold war period.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

To analyze our hypothesis we will split it into two parts and analyse them individually.

The first portion of the hypothesis — “ construct of “ Rogues States ” became a important portion of the US post-Cold War policy. ”

Use of the term “ knave ” by American policy shapers during the periods examined can be summarized as follows ( Table 1 ) . During the last old ages of the Cold War period, the construct was used on norm about one clip per twelvemonth. And zero times this concert was used by the leaders of the state. Much more attending was compelled to this construct after the terminal of the Cold War. Merely during the period from 1992 through the terminal of 1994, 48 articles ( or 16 per twelvemonth ) used this label. Although the use of the term “ knave ” by elect and other functionaries decreased somewhat, from 37.5 per centum in the Cold War period to 30.9 per centum in the post-Cold War period, in 10.9 per centum of instances ( 6/6+11+36 ) or 2 times per twelvemonth this construct was used by the leaders of the state. This fact can show greater attending to the “ Rogue States ” construct by the political elite.

Table 1. Public Statements by Speakers and Frequency Of Use

Time period

Speaker

FREQUENCY OF USE

President, vice-President, and Secretary of State

Other functionaries

Research workers

1981-1987

0

3 ( 37.5 % )

5 ( 62.5 % )

8

Per Year

0

0.43

0.71

1.14

1992-1994

6 ( 10.9 % )

11 ( 20.0 % )

38 ( 69.1 % )

48

Per Year

2

3.67

12.67

16

But did rogue provinces become a important political phenomenon? To understand it, we need non merely to cipher the figure of statements but analyze them. As the undermentioned statements illustrate, the battle with the “ knaves ” became so a precedence.

Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, 1993.

In the address to the United Nations, Madeleine K. Albright enumerated the “ four overarching ends ” — bond-strengthening, emerging-democracy assistance, rogue-state isolation, chaos-containment — as a scheme that “ looks to the expansion of democracy and markets abroad. ”[ 24 ]

Anthony Lake, President Clinton ‘s national security advisor, 1994

Anthony Lake said, that “ America is involved in an extension of the battle for democracy and against dictatorship aˆ¦ the battle is Manichaean: the forces of immorality ( rogue provinces, terrorists, tribalists ) against the forces of good ( democracies, tolerant societies ) . ”[ 25 ]

Furthermore, in depicting “ knaves, ” policy shapers in the post-Cold War period expend considerable energies in public statements solidifying the “ us against them ” nature of the relationship. During this period, policy shapers used the phrases like “ forces of immorality against forces of good, ” “ overarching end, ” “ Manichean battle, ” etc.

Taking into history that we did non happen the grounds that the statements and emotions like these were made in the period of 1981-1987, the obtained consequences can confirm the theory that the construct of “ Rogues States ” became a important portion of the US foreign policy after the terminal of the Cold War.

The 2nd portion of the hypothesis – “ the construct was related chiefly to the security involvements. ”

The obtained informations can put in tabular arraies in harmony with the examined periods. If we look at the Cold War informations ( Table 2 ) , we notice that the list of states that are called “ knaves ” is rather diverse. Apart from Iran, North Korea and Libya, it includes the USSR and even the USA ( one of the policy shapers called the USA “ knave ” because of the aggressive policy toward Third World states ) . On the other manus, the policy that made the province “ knave ” was highly general and obscure – like the Peace Threat ( 87.5 per centum of instances ) . Merely one time the state was charged with the Wish to Acquire WMD. These consequences tell us that the “ Rogue States ” construct during the Cold War period was indistinct and had more political and emotional instead than intelligent significance.

Table 2. Use of Rogue State Language by Country and Policy, 1981-1987

Country/

Policy

Peace Menace

Wish to Acquire WMD

Weapon trafficking

Terrorist Support

Democracy and Human Rights

Refusal to Support US Policy

No Reason

No

Persia

3

37.5 %

N.Korea

1

12.5 %

Libya

1

12.5 %

Soviet union

2

25 %

USA

1

12.5 %

87.5 %

12.5 %

With the terminal of the Cold War the American policymakers started paying more attending to the substance of the “ Rogue States ” label. The consequences of the post-Cold War analysis require scrupulous attending ( Table 3 ) .

Table 3. Use of Rogue State Language by Country and Policy, 1992-1994

Country/

Policy

Peace Menace

Wish to Acquire WMD

Weapon trafficking

Terrorist Support

Democracy and Human Rights

Refusal to Support US Policy

No Reason

No

9

10

2

2

1

1

25/29.0 %

Persia

2

3

1

4

1

2

13/15.1 %

Irak

6

8

2

1

3

20/23.2 %

N.Korea

1

4

4

1

3

13/15.1 %

Libya

2

3

1

6/7.0 %

Soudan

1

1/1.2 %

Pakistan

1

1/1.2 %

Ukrayina

2

2/2.3 %

Srbija

1

1/1.2 %

Gaiti

1

1/1.2 %

??hina

1

2

3/3.5 %

21/

24.5 %

31/

36.0 %

7

8.1 %

10/

11.6 %

6/

7.0 %

3/

3.5 %

8/

9.3 %

86/

100 %

How can we construe these consequences?

First, the obtained informations demonstrate that in malice of the absence of a clear definition, the “ Rogue States ” term applied largely to the specific group of states. Three provinces clearly emerge as those most often designated as knaves in American political rhetoric. They are Iraq with 23.2 per centum of all references, Iran with 15.1 per centum, and North Korea with 15.1 per centum ( wholly – 53.4 per centum of instances ) . In fact, during the Cold War period, Iran was often called a “ knave province ” every bit good ( 3 instances or 37.5 per centum ) , but the little figure of instances in the Cold War period will non allow us name the state of affairs with Iran “ a inclination. ” Besides, during this period, the frequent labeling of Iran as a “ knave ” can be explained by its war with Iraq which was supported by the US at that clip, while Iran was supported by the USSR. The other provinces mentioned as knave ( Libya, China, Ukraine, Sudan, Pakistan, Serbia, Haiti ) are for the most portion non really surprising from a political point of view ( with the possible exclusion of China and Ukraine ) though their frequence of reference is well less. The instance of China can be explained non by its “ knave ” nature but its lasting resistance to the countenances in the UN Security Council that caused the negative reaction of the United States. Ukraine really was non mentioned as a “ knave ” province, but the wish to retain WMD on its district, as American functionaries stated, “ would do Ukraine a knave state. ”

Second, two of the six countries of behaviour clearly dominate the attending of American policymakers when they consider the actions of knave provinces: their alleged chase of WMD ( 36.0 per centum of instances ) and the sensed menace such provinces pose to their neighbours and the universe at big ( 24.5 per centum ) . The consequences of our research demo really small concern of the American policy shapers about the Democracy and Human Rights in the post-Cold War period ( merely 7.0 per centum ) . As we see, their attending was focused chiefly on the issue of Peace Threat. But comparing with the Cold War period, Peace Threat has the concrete significance and is supported by the issues that are related to this concern, like non-proliferation of WMD, Terrorist Support and Weapon Trafficking ( wholly 80.2 per centum of instances ) . Besides, the “ Rogue States ” concern in 3.5 per centum of instances was applied to the states which refused to back up US countenances toward North Korea.

Third, in practically 38 % of instances ( 33 of 86 ) when US politicians and research workers used this stock phrase, they did non tie in it with the specific state or policy. How can we explicate this fact? The alternate theory could state us, for illustration, that policymakers used the “ Rogue States ” construct in order to make the stereotype and the tenseness in society and therefore to explicate the aggressive policy toward the selected states.

On the other manus, the state of affairs when the labeling was non accompanied by any account consists of two parts. The first figure of instances includes labeling the state without any ground ( N.Korea, Iran and Iraq with 9.3 per centum ) . And the 2nd 1 is labeling the policy without adverting specific state ( 29.0 per centum of instances ) . Actually, there is a difference between these two instances. When we label the state without any ground, it could be the illustration of the trough political relations. The illustration of this sort of political relations can be the phrase “ For many Americans, North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, is the archetypical knave province. ”[ 26 ]Otherwise, when we mention the policy that we associate with “ Rogue States, ” we merely seek to specify the construct. We need to advert here that among 25 instances of naming the policy “ knave ” , 40 per centum holds Wish to Acquire WMD and 36 per centum – Pearce Menace.

Decision

Two cardinal decisions can be drawn from the research.

First, with the terminal of the Cold War American policymakers have adopted the “ Rogue State ” construct as a important portion of the US foreign political relations.

Second, in malice of the fact that no clear definition of “ Rogue States ” appeared, this construct became more intelligent and clear. Three provinces clearly emerged as those most often designated as knaves in American political rhetoric. Furthermore, the countries of behaviour that could be considered as the “ rogue behaviour ” were distinguished by American policy shapers.

As the consequence, we can province that the “ Rogue States ” construct in the post-Cold War Period was related chiefly to the security involvements and is based on the premise that even if the Cold War ended, the atomic arm remained. The primary aim of the US foreign policy at that period — non-proliferation of atomic arms and continuing security in the universe – support this theory and our hypothesis.

However, it is clear that while there is a relationship between province behaviour and the application of the knave label, it is non automatic nor absolute. Sing the chase of arms of mass devastation, Paul D. Hoyt, the professor of political scientific discipline, argues that the greatest challenge to proliferation of arms of mass devastation in the 1990 ‘s did non take topographic point in states such as Iraq, Iran or North Korea but alternatively occurred in South Asia where both India and Pakistan non merely hold acquired, but detonated, atomic devices.[ 27 ]Yet, neither India nor Pakistan have been characterized as knaves even at that clip.

Similarly, Egypt and Syria do non look as rogue provinces in the rhetoric of American policymakers despite US authorities studies that they both are actively engaged in the chase of missile engineering and Syria is reportedly actively seeking to further develop its chemical arms capableness.[ 28 ]Some provinces which reportedly act as providers of arms of mass devastation, such as China and Russia, besides have escaped the appellation of knave province, though others, such as North Korea, have non.

With respect to the policy of allegedly patronizing international terrorist act, once more we see that prosecuting in this devilish behaviour is deficient to earn the knave label. This is most clearly seen in the instance of Syria, which has been cited as a “ province patron of terrorist act ” in the one-year study “ Patterns of Global Terrorism ” issued by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State.[ 29 ]Such “ province patrons ” are defined as those “ authoritiess [ which ] support international terrorist act either by prosecuting in terrorist activity themselves or by supplying weaponries, preparation, safehaven, diplomatic installations, fiscal backup, logistic and/or other support to terrorists. ”[ 30 ]However, Syria has non been named as a “ knave province ” .

As we see, while building a list of knave provinces is non a hard proposition, finding merely what it takes for a province to be considered a “ knave ” is a bit more complex. In the absence of a direct correlativity between policy behaviour and the application of the knave label, some alternate, or possibly extra, accounts for why and how states come to be considered as “ knaves ” need to be developed.

In malice of the fact that this research managed to explicate the “ Rogue States ” construct to some extent, more research in this issue should be conducted.

First, the construct of “ Rogue States ” should be explained non merely by the statements of the policy shapers, but the existent policy towards “ Rogue States. ” Thereupon it would be logical to add to our farther research one more variable, “ Policy Towards Rogues, ” and compare the statements of policy shapers with the policies aimed at keeping “ knave ” behaviour.

Second, rogue provinces present a quandary in finding whether they constitute a menace to or an chance for the promotion of US foreign policy. To reply this inquiry we need to associate the use of the term in clip with the major events in political and economic life of the US, every bit good as with the precedences of the US foreign policy.

There is no uncertainty that extension of our research, adding the new variables and linking to US foreign policy penchants every bit good as to domestic economic and political issues can give us a better apprehension of the application of the “ Rogue States ” construct and its beginning.